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Abstract The emergence and development of con-
vergent technologies for the purpose of improving
human performance, including nanotechnology, bio-
technology, information sciences, and cognitive sci-
ence (NBICs), open up new horizons in the debates
and moral arguments that must be engaged by
philosophers who hope to take seriously the question
of the ethical and social acceptability of these
technologies. This article advances an analysis of the
factors that contribute to confusion and discord on the
topic, in order to help in understanding why argu-
ments that form a part of the debate between trans-
humanism and humanism result in a philosophical
and ethical impasse: 1. The lack of clarity that
emerges from the fact that any given argument
deployed (arguments based on nature and human
nature, dignity, the good life) can serve as the basis
for both the positive and the negative evaluation of
NBICs. 2. The impossibility of providing these
arguments with foundations that will enable others
to deem them acceptable. 3. The difficulty of applying
these same arguments to a specific situation. 4. The
ineffectiveness of moral argument in a democratic
society. The present effort at communication about
the difficulties of the argumentation process is
intended as a necessary first step towards developing




The emergence and development of convergent
technologies for the purpose of improving human
performance [33], including nanotechnology, biotech-
nology, information technology, and cognitive science
(NBICs), open up new horizons in the debates and
moral arguments that must be engaged by philoso-
phers who hope to take seriously the question of the
ethical and social acceptability of these technologies.
Debates over the convergence of NBICs for the
purpose of human enhancement often entail the
following polarization:
– O no n es i d ea r et h o s ew h oa r e‘unconditionally for’,
the people known as transhumanists, such as Naam
[27], Bostrom [5] and Kurzweil [22]. These
authors invoke moral arguments related to freedom
and autonomy, nature and human nature, to legiti-
mizethepositionthattheonlywayforhumanbeings
to escape human incompleteness is to implement
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Sherbrooke, Québec, Canadascale, thus making it possible to surmount
biological limitations (the fragility of being;
disease and death) until the coming of the
human-machine hybrid or immortal cyborg—the
posthuman [19].
– On the other side are those who are ‘uncondi-
tionally against’, commonly known as the
humanists, like Fukuyama [15, 16]a n d
Habermas [18]. These authors reply by wielding
the semantic incompatibility of moral arguments
based on the nature, dignity, and good life of
fragile mortal human beings as evidence of
limitations that it is appropriate to impose in
order to restrain, indeed altogether prohibit, the
development of these new nanotechnological
powers in order to alter human beings and thus
dominate first human nature and then nature as a
whole.
As has been pointed out by Jean-Pierre Dupuy
[14], philosophical debates on the ethical foundations
of nanotechnologies have become so routine that one
could number the arguments constantly deployed and
observe that when one person invokes Argument
Number Ten, someone else invariably replies with a
corresponding counterargument: ‘The same argu-
ments are always served up, and they are always
answered with the same counter-arguments’. Why is
the philosophical debate reduced to this clash of
incompatible arguments and counterarguments? In
other words, why has the debate so far been destined
to remain mired in impasse? This is the preliminary
question to which we want to formulate some replies.
If we wish to grasp the relevance of philosophy to
the sphere of the social and ethical acceptability of the
development of new technologies, we must become
familiar with and understand those sources of the
conflict that account for the way the discussion ends
in impasse.
In the present article, we will advance the analysis
presented by Patenaude et al. [30], which identified the
threefold nature of a moral argument, the seven core
meanings of the moral arguments usually deployed in
debate about nanoethics, and the five moral stances that
underlie those seven moral arguments. In the polarized
climate of discussion between transhumanists and
humanists, the main arguments that clash are those based
on: nature and human nature; dignity; the good life;
autonomy; and rights. Focusing exclusively on these
arguments, our analysis will show how four factors help
us understand why the debate between transhumanism
and humanism has been incapable of a productive
outcome.
1. The ambiguity that results from the fact that a
single deployed argument (nature and human
nature; dignity; the good life) can serve as the
basis for both a positive and negative evaluation
of the development of NBICs, because the core
meaning of the argument’s moral utterance is not
specified.
2. The impossibility of providing these arguments
with foundations that will enable others to deem
them acceptable.
3. The difficulty of applying these arguments to a
specific situation.
4. The ineffectiveness of moral argument in a
democratic society.
To undertake this philosophical process of clarifi-
cation, it was necessary to examine all the texts
published in the journal NanoEthics since it was
founded in 2007. From among these texts, we
retained 14, based on two criteria: articles that discuss
moral arguments in favor of or against nanotechnol-
ogies; and articles on meta-ethics. We also analyzed
reports (including the National Science Foundation
Report, [1]) and recent books that met the same
criteria.
The Arguments’ Ambiguity
The ambiguity of the arguments used (arguments
based on nature and human nature, dignity, and the
good life) in these discussions between humanism and
transhumanism represents one factor contributing to
confusion and philosophical impasse. How are we to
account for this? We can do so using an analytic
model that relies on a definition of the notion of
ambiguity in philosophy. ‘We are dealing with an
ambiguity when the word or phrase has more than
one meaning within a given context and we are
uncertain which one to choose’ ([29]: 107). A model
of this definition appears in Fig. 1 below:
Based on this analytic model, we will see in what
follows that the arguments based on nature and
human nature, dignity, and the good life, as found in
the context of the moral utterances of the moral
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contributing to ambiguity and discord and lead to
philosophical and ethical impasses.
The Ambiguity of the Argument Based on Nature
and Human Nature
In the argument based on nature and human nature
that makes it possible to evaluate using convergent
NBICs for human enhancement, the core meaning of
the moral utterance is a prescription. This moral
utterance specifies what we must do or not do, taking
into account the knowledge we have of the laws that
govern nature and our own human nature. But the
argument is ambiguous, because it refers to at least
two contradictory justifications for the moral utter-
ance in the context of the debate between humanism
and transhumanism:
Sense A: Humanist “Nature” in its religious sense
implies everything God has created, laws that have
been handed down, and the order or plan that serves
as the criterion for judgment. For humanists like
Fukuyama, the human being who has been enhanced
with NBICs, the cyborg that the transhumanist Stock
[35] identifies with the ‘fusion of technology and
biology’, contradicts this divine and immutable order
of nature. However, it also threatens the Western
secular belief in a human nature as provisionally
fixed at the present day, in the sense that it is not
‘infinitely plastic’ in its biological complexity and can
only vary within a certain range determined by life:
‘Fukuyama maintains that human nature must be
considered fixed even if it isn’t, because the con-
sequences of extreme human plasticity would be the
disappearance of democratic values’ such as equality
and autonomy ([3]: 263). Democracies can and must
restrict these consequences for human nature: ‘True
freedom means the freedom of political communities
to protect the values’ associated with human nature
([15]: 218).
Sense B: Critical Transhumanists like Kurzweil [22]
reply that the essence of the human being resides not in
our limitations, but in our capacity to overcome them:
Then perhaps our basic disagreement is over the
nature of being human. To me, the essence of
being human is not our limitations—although we
do have many—it’s our ability to reach beyond
our limitations. We didn’t stay on the ground. We
didn’t even stay on the planet. And we are already
not settling for the limitations of our biology.
Kurzweil [22] thus prefers openness to human
enhancement by NBICs over a static utopia of human
nature. The biological nature of the human being can
vary without limitations at the whim of the develop-
ment of these convergent technologies (NBICs) of
which it is itself the matrix: ‘[T]here are no essential
barriers to our emulating these ways in our technol-
ogies, and we are already well down this path.’
Human enhancement by means of the development of
these technologies, carried out in order to transcend
the biological nature of the human being, would thus
have nothing sinister about it. It would be a part of the
tradition of human effort to continue that process of
self-appropriation that is constitutive of humanity. It is
for this reason that prohibiting the development of
NBICs is illegitimate. Thus for the philosopher
Dominique Lecourt [26], as expressed in his book
Humain post humain, ethics cannot remain limited by
the formulation of prohibitions in the name of human
nature, because the singularity process (the process of
hybridizing the human with the technological) is
constitutive of human nature:
And if we place the human being within the ‘flux
of the living’, as is appropriate, technological
reality cannot be thought about without viewing it
asanessential dimensionof human beings, whose
very nature it is to manifest themselves in
perpetual becoming, propelled by an ongoing
constructive and destructive dynamic.
The Impasse
From the ambiguous potential for both sense A and
sense B to be implied in the argument based on nature
Argument in the context of debate
A. Affirmative, humanist sense      vs  B. Critical, transhumanist sense
Fig. 1 Model for the analysis of ambiguity in an argument in
the context of debate. A. Affirmative, humanist sense vs B.
Critical, transhumanist sense
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can be used to evaluate the development of NBICs
both positively and negatively. The fullest philosoph-
ical critique of the equivocal interplay between senses
A and B in interpreting the concept of nature,
especially from a moral perspective, is that advanced
by John Stuart Mill ([23]: 672) in his critical essay
entitled ‘Nature’ (published in the posthumous work
Three Essays on Religion, 1874):
Theword‘nature’,saysMill,hastwomainsenses:
it denotes either the total system of things [both
artificial and natural] and all their properties, or
things the way they would be, absent all human
intervention. The doctrine that recommends that
human beings follow nature is absurd, because a
human being cannot do otherwise. Under the
second sense, the doctrine that recommends that
human beings follow nature, that is, the sponta-
neous [natural] course of things, as a model for
their own actions is irrational and immoral:
irrational because every human action consists of
changing the course of nature thus defined and
every useful action consists of improving it;
immoral because the course of things is full of
events that are unanimously deemed to be odious
when they result from the human will.
The ambiguity of the terms ‘nature’ and
‘human nature’ creates a dialogical impasse in
the debate between humanism and transhumanism
because it reflects the existence of at least two
contradictory justifications for maintaining that
the moral utterance follows the laws of nature.
So long as there is no philosophical discussion of
the grounds for adopting one conception of nature
over the other, the impasse will persist.
The Ambiguity of the Argument Based on Dignity
In moral utterances of the Kantian kind, we find the
moral prescription that expresses the condition for
possibility of our moral action: ‘Act in such a manner
that you treat humanity, both in your own person, and
in the person of any other, always at the same time as
an end and never simply as a means’ ([21]: 36).
Robert Theis [37] argues that this formulation of the
categorical imperative, which affirms the status of
humanness as an end in itself, forms the center of
gravity of Kant’s various statements of principle and
duty. On this view, the core meaning of the moral
argument based on dignity is that it is the nature of
humanity, in one’s own person and the person of
others, to be an end. In the debate between humanism
and transhumanism, this type of argument is ambig-
uous, because it can imply at least two contradictory
and incompatible senses:
Sense A: Humanist Fukuyama [15] invokes the return
of human dignity as a constraint on autonomy in the
Kantian sense: ‘It is the existence of free will that
leads to Kant’s well-known conclusion that human
beings are always to be treated as ends and not as
means.’ For some humanists, the cyborg (the human-
machine hybrid) manifests as a transgression of the
principle of human beings themselves constituting
ends. Thus dignity consists of making technological
choices founded on morally acceptable goals, in order
not to treat human beings as objects or means but to
treat them, rather, as ends in themselves, in this way
limiting the consequences of those technological
developments that affect our physical, psychological
or cultural identity.
Sense B: Critical For transhumanists, however, the
natural end of the human being flows from the free
choice to evolve towards conceptions of the cyborg in
order to allow for the fulfillment of the human desire
to be liberated from finiteness (biological limitations,
diseases, death): ‘The convergence of humanity and
technology seems to be the natural end of moving this
reasoning into the realm of speculation. The concepts
of “cyborgs” as technically enhanced humans or as
humanly enhanced technology can be raised’ ([17]:
80). This natural end is associated with the concept of
dignity-autonomy without constraints, which consti-
tutes the condition of a person who is self-
determining by virtue of her or his own nature. On
this view, humans obey only the law they invent. This
law promotes the freedom of human beings in ‘their
capacity for endless reinvention of their way of being
human according to the fulfillments of their specific
genius’ ([26]: 48).
The Impasse
The ambiguity created by the twofold interpretation of
the concept of dignity (senses A and B) lies at the
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ism and flows thence to be encountered more or less
everywhere. Thus it can be used as a way of
evaluating the NBIC process positively or negatively.
It represents a real problem for the philosopher
Brownsword [6], who wonders whether the normative
invention of nanomedicine is the least of our worries:
The problem is showcased by modern debates
concerning the ethics and regulation of biotech-
nology. Here, the idea of human dignity has
appeared in two very different roles, in the one
case acting in support of individual autonomy
(human dignity as empowerment) and, in the
other case, acting as a constraint on autonomy
(human dignity as constraint).
The impasse can be partly resolved by clarifying
the core meaning of the moral utterance that makes
the appeal to dignity. In the present case, three
different core meanings are referred to: the Kantian
one, the one based on autonomy, and the one based
on rights. Once the core meaning has been clarified,
we can deal with that aspect of the impasse that
relates to the justification for adopting one moral
argument or the other.
The Ambiguity of the Argument Based on the Good
Life
In this same context of debates between humanism
and transhumanism, arguments made on the basis of
the good life seek to evaluate human choices accord-
ing to their consequences for the conditions of human
life. Thus one finds in Paul Ricoeur’s celebrated
definition of the ethical purpose of the good life the
component of individual choice focused on happiness
while taking others and institutions into account:
‘aiming at the “good life” with and for others, in just
institutions’ ([31]: 172). On this view, a moral
evaluation of the good life rests on this question:
What are the consequences of human enhancement by
means of NBICs for the very conditions of life, both
individual and social? For example, what risks to our
current human conditions of life are entailed by
thinking and acting with the idea of creating an
immortal cyborg? Is this notion of transforming
ourselves in order to achieve infinity, with no
biological, cultural, or affective limitations (‘infinite
knowledge, infinite intelligence, infinite beauty,
infinite creativity, and infinite love’)( [ 22]: 476) in
continuity with our current experience of a happy
human life in the awareness of finiteness and death, or
does it represent a break with it? In the debate
between humanists and transhumanists, the argument
based on the good life is ambiguous because it
invokes at least two contradictory senses:
Sense A: Humanist What conception of the good life
do humans have? Humanists like Ricoeur generally
adopt a conception of happiness as an ultimate state to
which humanity aspires. Most humanists are in the
habit of opposing the acceptance of finiteness to the
immoderate desire for infiniteness, a boundless desire
that the Greeks denounced as hubris and that causes
humanity to descend into self-destruction and the
failure represented by despair. For the true happiness
of the human being as found in historical and concrete
existence consists not in acting out the immoderate
desire to conquer human finiteness (limitations, aging,
fear of death) in order to achieve infiniteness (the joy
of being infinite and immortal), but in the act of
accepting suffering and finiteness: ‘Man is the Joy of
Yes in the sadness of the finite’ ([32]: 140).
Humanists in general oppose this argument to
technological rationality, which strikes them as con-
sisting of that ideological degeneration that leads to
existentialist failure (humanity’s self-destruction). For
example, ‘[H]umanist wisdom requires coming to
terms with the natural finiteness that affects every
human being’ ([4]: 64), because the paradoxical self-
suppression of both the self and the world flows from
our scientific world, which attends to human beings’
imaginary needs and limitless desires to transcend
finiteness in order to carry out our transformation into
an immortal cyborg. ‘Posthuman utopias derive from
a similar ambition. What is strange is that some
people don’t hesitate to defend the paradox that
consists of associating the future good life with the
disappearance of humans as they are now’ ([4]: 23).
As Comte-Sponville ([10]: 37; [9]: 251) puts it, ‘What
then can we hope for? Nothing beyond death, so
nothing absolute: any contentment of mortals is
mortal, and life, if it is worth anything, is only worth
something in its finiteness.’
Sense B: Critical In the transhumanist perspective of
Stock [36], however, the unhappiness of life consists
of continuing to resemble cavemen. ‘But this lack of
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human good life can only be obtained via reliance on
the notion, as a driving concept, of the development
of technological powers that will surpass our biolog-
ical and cultural limitations to the point of infiniteness
(the immortal cyborg). The desire to obtain this
becomes the direct condition for, and the engine that
drives, the action opposed to humanist and existen-
tialist resignation. This however, does not mean that
in the future the good life of the cyborg will no longer
be similar to a commitment to being rationally human
(as opposed to a commitment to being posthuman):
‘In other words, future machines will be human, even
if they are not biological’ ([22]: 30). What then does
the moral measure of the good life of the self-
enhancing human being consist of? Stock [36] heeds
Marcus Garvey’s imperative, which he quotes in the
introduction to his book Redesigning Humans: Our
Inevitable Genetic Future: ‘God and Nature first
made us what we are, and then out of our own
created genius we make ourselves what we want to
be…. Let the sky and God be our limit and Eternity
our measurement.’On this understanding, the good
life consists of eliminating all suffering (suffering
caused by our limitations, aging, diseases, and death)
that flows from the human biological condition ([22]:
3; [1]: 27).
The Impasse
The two senses of the argument based on the good
life are irreconcilable. For a humanist, the good life is
the best possible life that humans can attain individ-
ually and collectively by accepting their human
condition of finiteness, because human misfortune
resides in the fact that human beings do not know
they only need very little to be happy, as well as the
fact that they hold onto imaginary needs and limitless
desires. For a transhumanist, on the other hand, the
good life is the life a person attains as follows: by
choosing, as a means of empowerment to escape the
present-day image of the imperfect human being, to
eliminate through NBICs the suffering inflicted by
biological finiteness; and by increasing the desire to
move towards the happiness of being perfect and
infallible in the image of the immortal cyborg of the
future. The impasse once again resides in the
justification for the moral argument.
The Impossibility of Providing These Arguments
with Foundations That Enable Others to Deem
Them Acceptable
The first part of our analysis has shown that once the
core meaning of the moral utterances are clearly
stated, the dialogical impasses reside in the justifica-
tion for the moral arguments. Both transhumanists
and humanists have bases for justifying the sense they
give to each argument. Can we find a philosophical
discussion in the literature that demonstrates the
superiority of the basis for the claims of one argument
over the other? If so, in what way would the critical
sense (B) relied on by transhumanists be superior to
the affirmative sense (A) argument relied on by the
humanists?
The Impossibility of Providing a Foundation
for the Argument Based on Nature and Human Nature
With the Christian religion continuing to serve as a
fundamental reference point for many people, some
transhumanists, like Naam [27], seek to found their
interpretation of the arguments based on nature and
human nature on the claim that ‘playing God’, that is,
enhancement by technological means, in itself con-
stitutes the fullest expression of human nature:
‘Playing God’ is actually the highest expression
of human nature. The urges to improve our-
selves, to master our environment, and to set our
children on the best path possible have been the
fundamental driving forces of all of human
history. Without these urges to ‘play God’, the
world as we know it wouldn’t exist today. ([22]:
299)
As an opposing argument, some humanists can
point out to transhumanists that, according to the
Bible, it is forbidden to ‘play God’. An impasse arises
here in that still other authors critique this theological
approach:
Finally, we will mention here the related,
persistent concern that we are playing God with
world-changing technologies, which is presum-
ably bad (Peters 2007). But what exactly counts
as ‘playing God’, and why is that morally
wrong; i.e., where exactly is the proscription in
religious scripture? ([1]: 27; [2]: 252)
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that philosophical knowledge of moral issues amounts
to nothing but belief. Further, he calls on us to detach
ethics from the belief in the Absolute that humanist
philosophers have so far tended to cling to as the
justification for prohibitions against technological
modifications of human nature:
The philosophical question that has not ceased
to inform the thought of most philosophers
concerned with ethics has been that of founding
in the Absolute values on which to base the
formulation of maxims capable of entailing
everyone’s compliance with interdictions and
prescriptions.
As Lecourt explains ([26]: 50), this religious
tendency could only be sustained until the nineteenth
century: since that time, the natural component of the
human being has been seen in a biological light.
Humanist detractors, however, denounce the reduc-
tive nature of biological conceptions of the human
being. For example, since there is nothing to prove that
scientific truth can establish a natural, biological order
as the basis for a moral argument that willhenceforward
protect progress from all risks, a humanist like Margaret
Somerville [34] invites us to turn instead, for the
justification for decisions made in favor of respecting
human nature (in the humanist sense), to those moral
intuitions that have been widely relied on as truths of
the human spirit throughout human history.
Other humanists continue to seek justifications in
science for setting biological limits on the technological
transformation of humans. For example, the philoso-
phers Leclerc and Trépanier [25] examine the limita-
tions of the biological body of the human being from
the strictly scientific perspective (as currently under-
stood), based on studies like biologist Dominique
Lambert and philosopher/physicist René Rezsöhazy’s
Comment les pattes viennent au serpent : Essai sur
l’étonnante plasticité du vivant (“How the Snake Got
its Feet: An Essay on the Astonishing Plasticity of
Living Beings”;[ 24]).
The debate around the justification for the different
senses of the argument based on nature and human
nature reveals a clash between religion - or philoso-
phy - based knowledge of the laws of nature and
science-based knowledge of the laws of nature. The
epistemological question of moral issues is embedded
in this debate.
The Impossibility of Providing a Foundation
for the Argument Based on Dignity
What might justify submitting to the Kantian argu-
ment based on dignity as a basis for ordaining that the
human being must not become a technological means
to an end other than him or herself (i.e., must not
become a cyborg)? To the extent that humanist
detractors like Fukuyama rely for their argument on
Kant’s moral philosophy, which is designed to answer
the limitations of metaphysical knowledge and the
natural determinism of the phenomenal world studied
by science, the moral justification is based on that
transcendental inquiry that assumes that we can only
have access to that which makes our moral experience
possible. If the categorical imperative is experienced
as an unconditional imperative, existing in a supra-
sensible, intelligible world and presenting the ultimate
purpose of the human being and the prohibition
against treating the human being as a means, then
for Kant, this represents the very condition of the
moral experience that preserves dignity-autonomy.
But should the current debate between humanism
and transhumanism put in doubt this Kantian tran-
scendental analysis, which Fukuyama [15] subscribes
to as a way of justifying the position that any
technology that does not respect human beings as
ends in themselves violates God’s will? Is there a
transhumanist critique of Kantian dignity that could
bring the community of citizens to transform itself
into members of a group in a state of dialogue, not to
say consensus? If a transhumanist critiques Kant's or
Ricoeur's foundation for the argument based on
dignity, it is incumbent on her or him to oppose to
the transcendental and phenomenological analyses an
alternative foundation for analysis. No such critique is
explicitly presented in the texts by Kurzweil and
Naam included in our study.
Ontheotherhand,itisequallyvaintosearchfortexts
by transhumanists that demonstrate the validity and
superiority of the libertarian concept of dignity involv-
ing no constraint on individual freedom to choose. Why
should we agree that a strictly libertarian vision of
dignity, adduced in support of unconstrained autonomy,
is more acceptable than the Kantian concept of dignity
as a constraint? No true philosophical debate exists
between transhumanism and humanism on the rational
foundations for the use of the idea of dignity in either
sense.
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for the Argument Based on the Good Life
DoesthereexistadebatethatdemonstratesthatRicoeur’s
vision of thehumanist senseof thegood life is superior to
the transhumanist sense? Why should we accept the
humanists’ view that the good life is the best possible life
that humans can attain for themselves, both individually
and collectively, by accepting the human condition of
finiteness? In Fallible Man, Ricoeur [32] presents an
analysis based on the philosophical method of
phenomenology. Ricoeur turns to the discourse of
the pathos of wretchedness from Plato to Pascal to
justify the position that human beings, who are
determined by their natural finiteness and the anguish
that flows from being destined to die (up to
Kierkegaard), can only embark on the good life on
one condition: acceptance of their finiteness in all its
Kantian categories (time, space, causality, destiny),
which incites them to assign a meaning to human life
in the face of the experience of suffering and death. He
quotes Kant: “F o rt ob ei nn e e do fh a p p i n e s sa n da l s o
worthy of it and yet not to partake of it could not be in
accordance with the complete volition of an omnipotent
rational being if we assume such….” (qtd. in Ricoeur
[32]: 67). The humanist Dupuy [12, 13, 14] seems to
be taking the same phenomenological approach as
Ricoeur when he states that one of the main
philosophical errors made in dealing with human
enhancement consists of confusing human nature with
the human condition (that is, the human biological
condition) and of thus failing to face the question of
the impact of technologies on the human condition:
There is another major philosophical error which
mars the contributions to bioethics or nanoethics
that I have read: they almost always confuse
human nature and the human condition. They
raise questions about the impact of technologies
on human nature to which, as they probably know
full well, no answer can be given, and this allows
them to avoid raising the same questions with
respect to the human condition.
From this phenomenological position, he argues [12]:
The problem no longer consists of knowing up
to what point we may or may not transgress
nature. The problem, rather, is that the very
notion of transgression is at the point of losing
all meaning. Human beings will no longer
encounter anything other than a world that
mirrors humanity’s own artificial creations.
([12]: 66)
But on what basis could a transhumanist convince
a humanist that the phenomenological approach to the
justification for conceptions of the good life should be
abandoned in favour of another approach that justifies
the transhumanist conception? The transhumanist
critique consists of no more than saying that it is
difficult to judge in advance what the perspective of
the enhanced human will be, given that in the present
we continue to be limited by our condition of
finiteness.
An observation by Margaret Somerville clearly
illustrates the problem of the justification for moral
arguments. Since it is impossible to provide objective
proofs of metaphysical beliefs (it’s not a question of
demonstrable fact), and since certain kinds of knowl-
edge (for example, moral intuitions that have been
widely shared for a long time) do not constitute ‘exact
sciences’, relativists reject these beliefs and these
kinds of knowledge. Instead they rely exclusively on
fact demonstrated by ‘pure’ or technical reasoning:
The common ground between those who take a
principle-based approach to ethics (many of
whom found their principles in religious or
spiritual beliefs) and many, but not all, of those
who are moral relativistists is that both believe
they know and are promoting the truth—or at
least a partial truth. Their polarization results
from the opposite content of what they believe
that truth to be.
The resulting conflict can never be resolved—
but again, it has to be accommodated ([34]:
195).
The Difficulty of Applying the Argument
to a Specific Situation
In the debate between humanism and transhumanism,
the dialogical impasse arises not only, as we have
seen so far, in relation to the ‘moral utterance’ and the
‘justification’ components of a moral argument; but
also in relation to the ‘application to a specific case’
component. What is common to the practical reason-
ing of all the humanist arguments is that the
application of a moral argument to a specific case
302 Nanoethics (2011) 5:295–307always consists of a reasoning process that starts from
the general moral utterance and moves to a specific
situation. In order to ensure the passage from the
general to the particular, intermediate categories are
needed. Each moral argument requires specific inter-
mediate categories.
– In order to apply the argument based on nature
and human nature, humanists refer us to the a
priori distinction between the natural (the biolog-
ical) and the artificial (the technological) that
serves as a guide for defining the limits for
projects for human enhancement. For example, if
a scientist proposes a project to implant an
electronic chip in order to increase the capabili-
ties of the human brain, humanist reasoning
would consist of saying that the chip derives
from artifice and does not respect that which is of
the natural.
– In order for the Kantian argument based on
dignity as a constraint (i.e., dignity in the
humanist sense A) to be able to prohibit all cases
of transformation of the human being into a
cyborg, Fukuyama forcefully insists, as Naam
[27] observes, on applying the a priori distinction
between that which relates to therapy and that
which relaters to human enhancement:
Fukuyama would like to restrict more than just
technologies for engineering genes, arguing that
governments need to ‘draw red lines’ around
technologies in general, ‘to distinguish between
therapy and enhancement, directing research
toward the former while putting restrictions on
the latter’.
– In order for the moral argument based on the
good life to serve to prohibit various possible
development plans for brain-machine interfaces
or cyborgs (as proposed in the discourse of
human enhancement), the humanists begin with
the a priori distinction between human limitations
(the biological condition of finiteness) that are to
be accepted and the desideratum of no human
limitations (infiniteness).
On the other hand, however, the transhumanists do
not need such a priori distinctions in order to apply their
moral arguments, because their moral posture does not
impose any limitations on action. Nevertheless, they
share the same conception of practical reasoning,
because they critique the validity of these humanist
distinctions by requiring that they be a priori clear and
precise.
The transhumanists’ application of their moral
arguments to a specific case follows the same line of
reasoning from a general principle to a specific case.
But since their general principles do not impose a
limit on certain actions, all human transformations are
permissible. The transhumanists also seem to share
the same framework for practical reasoning as the
humanists, as is shown by the controversies over the a
priori distinctions brought forward by the humanists’
arguments.
– CriticalphilosopherslikeAllhoffetal.[1] make the
point that they cannot continue defending the use
of the analytical distinction between the natural
and the artificial: ‘However, the natural-versus-
artificial distinction, as a way to identify human
enhancements [or unnatural enhancements], may
prove most difficult to defend given the vague-
ness of the term “natural”.’ In this context of the
ethics of human enhancement, the nature of the
natural (the biological) is vague precisely because
the natural is joined to the artificial (the techno-
logical), which is in question. For example, the
dream of implanting an NBIC chip (viewed as
artificial) designed to a nanometric scale (10
−9 m)
presupposes that this chip will meld into those
biological conditions ([8]: 34).
– Transhumanists respond to humanists like
Fukuyama that the application of the a priori
distinction between therapy and enhancement, as
a way of protecting the human being as an end in
its bodily and spiritual integrity, is not clear. On
the contrary, it is vague, because therapy (for
example, therapeutic applications of nanotechno-
logical machines such as neurological prostheses
used to repair nervous-system damage causing
diminished capacities) blends into human en-
hancement (for example, increasing the capacity
of the human brain by means of the use of even
more advanced nanotechnological machines that
increase the speed of interface, raising it to a
higher level than normal). In one of his argu-
ments, Naam reasons that if we ban all research
that focuses on enhancement, we automatically
ban most research on healing the sick and injured
([27]: 5).
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life” becomes vacuous in the sense of being even
a vague guide for action,’ precisely because this a
priori distinction between certain human limita-
tions (the human biological condition) that must
be accepted and those human limitations that it is
permissible to alter without limitations is not
sufficiently clear to be considered a point of
departure:
In the future, with human enhancements, things
will be less clear. Do we know if particular
‘enhancements’ will improve life? Will en-
hanced people be happier, and if not, why
bother with enhancements? Can we say much
about the ‘good life’ for an ‘enhanced’ person?
The debate between humanists and transhumanists
regarding the ‘application to a specific case’ compo-
nent of moral arguments shows us that: (1) both sides
share the same framework, that of reasoning from the
general principle to a specific case; and (2) there
exists a need for a priori distinctions of intermediate
categories. In the transhumanists’ view, their own
critique of the humanists’ inability to make clear-cut
distinctions reveals the rational superiority of the
transhuhumanist position. But is this the case?
According to Allhoff et al. [1], the fact that
distinctions are somewhat vague a priori doesn’t
necessarily mean that they are to be written off. The
solution proposed consists of maintaining that these
distinctions can only be made on a case-by-case basis;
that is, they become clear a posteriori. This is well
illustrated by the ‘paradox of the heap’:
Given a heap of sand with N number of grains of
sand, if we remove one grain of sand, we are still
left with a heap of sand (that now only has N - 1
grains of sand). If we remove one more grain, we
are again left with a heap of sand (that now has N -
2 grains). If we extend this line of reasoning and
continuetoremovegrainsofsand,weseethatthere
is no clear point P where we can definitely say that
a heap of sand exists on one side of P, but less than
aheapexistsontheotherside.Inotherwords,there
is no clear distinction between a heap of sand and a
l e s s - t h a n - a - h e a po re v e nn os a n da ta l l .
However, the wrong conclusion to draw here is
that there is no difference between them or that the
distinction between a heap and no-heap should be
discarded (or between being bald and having hair, as a
variation of the paradox goes). Likewise, it would seem
fallacious to conclude that there is no difference between
therapy and enhancement or that we should dispense
with the distinction. It may still be the case that there is no
moral difference between the two, but we cannot
arrive at it through the argument that there is no clear
defining line or that there are some cases (such as
vaccinations, etc.) that make the line fuzzy. As with
'heap', the terms 'therapy' and 'enhancement' may
simplybevaguelyconstructedandrequiremoreprecision
to clarify the distinction.
Kurzweil [22] questions this paradox, wondering
where the distinction between the human and the
posthuman lies:
If we regard a human modified with technology as
no longer human, where would we draw the line? Is
ahu manwithabion ich eartstillh uman ?Ho wabou t
someone with a neurological implant? What about
two neurological implants? How about someone
with ten nanobots in his brain? How about 500
million nanobots? Should we establish a boundary
at 650 million nanobots: under that, you’re still
human and over that, you’re posthuman?
Allhoff's comments indicate that there are other
ways of conceptualizing the ‘application to a specific
case’ component of a moral argument.
The Ineffectiveness of Moral Argument
in a Democratic Society
The final impasse between moral arguments that arises in
the humanist-transhumanist debate opposes the argu-
mentsbasedonnatureandhuman nature,dignity,and the
goodlife to thearguments basedon autonomyand rights.
As we have seen, the core meaning of the transhumanist
argument based on dignity is actually the same as that of
the moral argument based on autonomy and rights. The
two arguments are usually combined, because in order to
live in society, the autonomy of one must be the limit of
the autonomy of the other [7]; and this is why the
democratic recognition of rights exists.
The debate here is focused on the possibility of
using moral argumentation in a democratic society in
order to justify regulating nanotechnology.
The first critique concerns the appeal to religious
foundations for moral arguments.
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nature and human nature be imposed on the law of a
secular society?
In reality, it is hard to condemn transgressions
of the natural order, given that such trans-
gressions are a constant in the history of human
activity. And as a matter of principle, transgres-
sion of the divine order could, for its part, not be
condemned as such in a secular society. ([28]:
119)
Furthermore, in this same context of law within a
secular society, what is the value of the argument
based on dignity in its humanist, Kantian sense.
The most flagrant problem here is the fact that it
is a struggle to give a clear meaning to this
notion of ‘human dignity’, which serves as a
kind of hold-all and makes it possible to
condemn without having to engage in further
argument—and that is precisely the difficulty
when what we are seeking here is the basis for a
process of moral argumentation on nanotech-
nologies. For this reason, obligation-based
ethics are no more effective in convincing us
that nanoethics are necessary. ([28]: 119–120)
But what moral validity would attach to the
democratic solution to this question of the social
acceptability of the morally good life of human beings
enhanced by NBICs, without rational debate on that
same validity in such a society? We can only assume
that the democratic solution applied to NBICs, absent
true philosophical debate, is inefficient because it
merely entrenches moral subjectivism. The democrat-
ic argument presupposes a moral theory known as
moral subjectivism; but why should we take moral
subjectivism to be superior to other moral arguments?
Rather than being a moral argument, democracy is in
fact more of a modus operandi that serves to avoid the
logical impasses we arrive at. Dupuy [11] denounces
the absence of moral inquiry from this modus
operandi as found in France:
Does moral philosophy allow us to see clearly
in this field? Certainly, the answer to this
question is not to be found in France. There,
philosophers and members of the military don’t
talk to each other, and it’s in the political arena
that the task of deciding one of the most
fundamental issues in the life of a nation is
performed. Democracy is yet again serving as a
pretext for the absence of moral inquiry. But the
ritual of the vote will never replace rational
debate. We must look to America.
Finally, decision making on regulation of nano-
technology in democratic societies always involves a
trade-off between economic wealth and quality of life.
How does democracy apply its general principle to a
specific case?
The danger is to think of the future simply in
terms of economic development. Sarewitz
argues that there is a difference between
developing technologies that improve quality
of life and developing technologies that stimu-
late economic growth with the (sometimes
mistaken) presumption that economic growth
will lead to improvements in the quality of life.
([20]: 29)
Conclusion
The philosophical debate between humanism and
transhumanism around the question of the social
acceptability of NBICs for the purposes of human
enhancement has so far been mired in impasse
because of the various argument-based difficulties
that we have just analyzed, which can be summarized
as follows.
1. The ambiguity of the types of moral argument
used: nature and human nature; dignity-
autonomy; the good life. The ambiguity results
from the fact that a single name for a concept
does not suffice to convey the precise meaning of
the moral utterance being deployed. That is why
it can serve for both positive and negative
evaluations of the development of NBICs. This
difficulty does not constitute an impasse if
humanists and transhumanists will agree to define
the sense assigned to the key concepts (nature,
dignity, the good life). A clear utterance of the
moral argument, combined with specific state-
ments about the justifications for these utterances,
will help overcome the impasse related to
meaning and will contribute to more clearly
identifying the impasse related to justification.
2. Every moral argument has its own justification. In
the texts we have analyzed, there is very little
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Moreover, we found no debate whatever about
the superiority of a given justification for an
argument. No one can provide reasons that make
it possible to say the moral obligation they are
advancing on the basis of nature, dignity, or the
good life is based on reason. The absence of
debate about the rationality of the grounds for
justifying a moral argument seems to confirm that
morality is no more than a matter of beliefs and
lies outside any form of rationality. The absence
of consensus on how to reconcile these irrecon-
cilable arguments is clear.
3. What does the debate over the application of a
moral utterance to a specific case reveal? Both
transhumanists and humanists share the same
conception of practical reason, requiring that
certain distinctions be made clear and precise a
priori in order to apply a given argument to a
situation. Perhaps this position should be reex-
amined in light of the discussion of a priori and a
posteriori. Is it necessary, for purposes of practical
reasoning, to have a priori distinctions or a
posteriori ones? Must we reject all distinctions
that are a priori? The fact that distinctions made a
priori are vague does not necessarily mean they
should be written off. As ‘the paradox of the
heap’ so effectively illustrates, the proposed
approach to a solution consists of saying that it
is only case-by-case that the senses of the
distinctions will become clear a posteriori.
4. The final impasse is quite complex because it is
twofold. In this article we are strictly analysing
the impasse related to moral arguments. The
question of how we can articulate a place for
moral debate in a democratic society is another
matter. In the encounter between the arguments of
humanists and those of transhumanists, moral
limitations on autonomy are opposed to demo-
cratic social limitations on autonomy (rights).
This debate on moral and legal limitations to
nanotechnology seems to revisit the basic as-
sumption that positive law embodies the separa-
tion of law and morals.
Behind the impression of routine recourse to moral
arguments in nanoethics lie a number of dialogical
impasses that we have identified under four headings.
When philosophers take part in an interdisciplinary
dialogical process of ethical, economic, environmental,
legal, and social evaluation of nanotechnology, they are
confronted with these impasses and must try to find
answers.
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